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In the  six years  since deregulation, the  financial  sector
has frequently dominated national economic news.  We have seen the
proliferation of financial  instruments, non-financial firms  moving into
the financial  service business, severe financing problems in agriculture
and energy, a growing number of bank failures, the  insurance crises  in
the thrifts  in Maryland and Ohio,  the growing problems of the public
insurance scheme  for savings and loan associations  (FSLIC),  uncertainty
about monetary growth and policy in the U.S.,  and the  integration of
financial markets of developed countries.  Not all  of the changes  in  the
financial  sector since 1980  can be attributed to  deregulation or  the
competitive forces  unleased by deregulation.  The US  economy of  the  1980s
is  very different from the  1970s.  We have moved from high to  low
inflation,  from low to high real  interest rates,  from strong  to weak
export growth, from a weak to  a strong to  a potentially weak dollar,  from
fast  to slow to  unpredictable money supply growth, and so on.  We started
the decade with a severe recession, followed by a half decade of only
moderate economic growth.  We have had wide  swings  in primary commodity
prices with concomitant boom and bust in agriculture  and domestic energy.
We have also had rapid technological change  in information processing and
communications which has  changed the way we do business.  Given the
changes  in the US  and world economy during  the 1980s,  technological
Paper presented at  the University of Kansas Midwest Symposium on
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change, and deregulation,  it  is  difficult  to  separate  temporary responses
from permanent changes  in the  financial service  industry.  And it  is  hard
to  sort out which changes  should be  attributed to  deregulation.  It is
harder still to predict future  financial sector developments.
Nevertheless  it may be useful  to examine  the evidence  on changes  in the
1980s  and highlight the emerging  issues.  Many Midwestern communities  are
primarily concerned about changes  in  the  delivery system and the
implications  for the  pricing  and availability of  services, efficiency,
equity, and stability.
The Roots  of Financial  Sector Regulation
The rash of bank failures during  the Great Depression set  the agenda
for bank regulation for the  following 45 years.  Those failures were
originally attributed  to  "excessive competition"  among financial
institutions.  The primary objectives  of public policy adopted during the
Depression were to  discourage  "excessive  competition,"  prevent bank
failures and encourage  "safety and soundness"  in the banking system.  The
regulatory framework included restrictions  on competition among financial
institutions, monitoring and inspection by regulatory agencies,  and
deposit  insurance schemes administered by  the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation  (FDIC) and the Federal Savings  and Loan Insurance  Corporation
(FSLIC)  to  restore public confidence  in the banking system.  Efforts  to
discourage  "excessive competition"  and risk-taking by banks  led to an
elaborate  set of restrictions  on pricing, product-lines,  and branching
and location of banks.  The regulatory  framework for  thrifts,  i.e.
savings and loan associations,  and mutual savings banks, came later,  but
also  restricted competition and further segmented financial markets by3
limiting the  range of activities allowed to  each type of  institution.
This  legislative framework made finance one  of the most highly regulated
sectors  in  the U.S. 1
The regulatory framework  did provide the semblance  of stability  in
the  financial sector.2 There were  few bank and thrift  failures  in the
1940s,  1950s,  and 1960s.  Financial  institutions, protected from
competition, generally prospered.  But this  stability was based on a
system of restricted competition, segmented markets, distorted prices  and
implicit subsidies.  The costs  and benefits of the regulations varied
over time  depending on macroeconomic conditions.  For example,  the
interest  rate ceilings,  Regulation Q, became more of a burden after  the
mid-1960s.  For most of the period from 1933  to 1966  the deposit rate
ceilings were not binding.  However, after market interest  rates rose
above the  deposit rate ceilings  in 1966,  the ceilings were usually
binding until deregulation.  The  system sent distorted savings and
borrowing signals to  the economy.  During periods  of high market interest
1  Bank entry and expansion was regulated by the McFadden Act of
1927.  The Banking Acts  of 1933  and 1935 prohibited interest payments on
transactions  accounts  (checking deposits)  and limited the  interest rates
payable on time  deposits.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933  segmented the
financial  service industry, restricted competitive behavior in banking,
and limited the  activities of commercial banks,  e.g. commercial banks
were not allowed to  engage  in  investment banking or provide investment-
related financial services  such as  underwriting, brokerage,  or mutual
funds.  The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,  grandfathered in existing
institutions, but restricted further interstate expansion by BHC,  thus
halting the growth of interstate  systems.  State laws  determined the  in-
state branching and expansion privileges  of commercial banks.
2  It is  not clear that  the  stability  in the financial  sector was
due  to restrictions on competition.  It has been argued that  the
stability of the  financial  sector was due  to  the more appropriate post-
Depression policy for  the discount window and the deposit  insurance
schemes rather than the  specific pricing and activities restrictions
placed on financial  institutions.4
rates,  savers  subsidized borrowers  and deposit  ceilings  functioned as  an
implicit tax on small savers.  Deposit rate  restrictions  also contributed
to  several credit crunches  during the second half of the 1960s  and first
half of the  1970s.  Inflation and volatile macroeconomic conditions made
financial regulation increasingly.burdensome throughout  the  1970s.
Starting slowly in  the  1960s,  and at  a rapid clip during the  1970s,  more
aggressive managers  of financial institutions  learned to  circumvent  the
regulations.
Financial Innovation
The inflation of the  1960s and 1970s provided  the incentives  for
financial institutions,  as  well as  the business  sector  to  improve  liquid
asset management.  Financial  institutions developed creative non-
interest means  of competing for deposits,  including extensive branching,
implicit subsidies on financial services, and deposit  "bonuses."
Financial institutions  also began to  experiment with loopholes  in the
regulations  to pay interest on deposits  to  compete with the interest-
bearing depository facilities available  from nonfinancial competitors.
One  of the most dramatic experiments was  the introduction of negotiable
order of withdrawal  (NOW) accounts by a commercial bank in Massachusetts
in 1972.  During the  remainder of the 1970s  regulations  on deposits were
eased gradually to accommodate new savings instruments  developed by
innovative  financial institutions. 3 As the  financial  industry became
more efficient  at circumventing  regulations by introducing new financial
instruments or  institutions,  there was a need to  either reregulate or
3For example,  automatic  transfer savings  (ATS) were introduced in
1978  and six-month money market certificates were  allowed after  1978.5
deregulate  the  system.
Deregulation
While ad hoc changes  in the  financial  laws and regulations had taken
place during the 1960s  and 1970s,  there were sweeping changes  in the  1980
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act  (DIDMCA)
and the  1982 Garn-St. Germain Act.4 These  two pieces  of legislation
represented a change  in philosophy from strict regulation to  allowing
4  Major provisions  of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980:
(1)  deposit ceiling for  all depository institutions were phased
out over a six-year period ending March 31,  1985;
(2)  all  depository institutions were allowed to offer interest-bearing
transaction accounts;
(3)  usury ceilings on many asset categories were eased, subject  to  state
approval;
(4)  deposit insurance coverage was  increased from $40,000  to $100,000  at
federally insured institutions;
(5)  all depository institutions, including thrifts and credit unions,
were required to hold reserves with the Federal Reserve system
(6)  Federal Reserve correspondent  services were  to be  competitively
priced and made available  to  all  depository institutions;
(7)  nonbank depository institutions, including credit unions, savings
and loan associations, and mutual savings banks gained borrowing
privileges at  the Federal Reserve System discount window;
(8)  portfolio restrictions were relaxed on savings and loan
associations, mutual savings banks,  and federal credit unions;
(9)  savings  and loan associations were allowed to  issue  credit  cards,
offer  trust services, and invest up to  20 percent of their assets  in
consumer and commercial loans  and corporate debt  securities.
The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 broadened the power of  thrifts and
allowed all depository institutions to  offer deposits paying a market
interest rate.  In addition the Garn-St. Germain Act attempted to address
the  growing problem of financial institution failures.  Major provisions
of the Garn-St. Germain Act of  1982:
(1)  authorized depository institutions  to  offer an account that would be
competitive with money market mutual funds;
(2)  allowed depository  institutions  to  cross  state  lines  to  acquire a
failing institution;
(3)  expanded the authority of the  FDIC  to provide assistance  to  prevent
the closing of FDIC insured banks;
(4)  each deposit insurance agency was  to  develop a proposal for deposit
insurance reform.6
market forces and competition to  play a role  in shaping the  financial
industry. 5 A  few provisions  of the new laws  strengthened the  role  of  the
regulators, but  in most respects restrictions  on the activities of
financial institutions were reduced.  Deregulation allowed price
competition, marketing of new financial  instruments and services,  and
reduced the regulatory disparities between banks  and thrifts.  Market
forces were  to  be used to  supplement regulation and monitoring of the
"safety and soundness"  of  the banking system.  If weak financial
institutions were allowed to  fail,  the regulators hoped that  the public
would also monitor performance and penalize financial institutions  for
excessive risk-taking.
The  laws of 1980  and 1982  left a major aspect of regulation intact;
restrictions on interstate  and intrastate expansion by financial
institutions.  The dismantling of geographic restrictions was  left under
state control.  State  governments were  allowed to  set  the  timing and
conditions under which out-of-state  institutions would be  allowed to
enter local markets.  A majority  of states have now eased geographic
restrictions.
Deregulation dismantled the price  structure  and restraints on
competition that had made commercial banking a very profitable and low
risk business.  Reducing restrictions  on pricing, product development,
and competition allowed market forces  to  influence market structure and
practices.  Deregulation, combined with volatile macroeconomic conditions
during the  1980s,  has accelerated  the rate  of change  in the  financial
5Because of the central role  of  commercial banks  in monetary
control and the  federally-sponsored deposit  insurance schemes,  it is
highly unlikely that banks will ever be  totally deregulated.7
service  industry that had started in the  1960s  and 1970s.6
Changes  in the Financial  Sector during the  1980s
Market Structure and Size  Distribution
At  the beginning of the 1980s,  there were  over 14,000 commercial
banks;  most were small. 7 The money-center banks  of New York, California,
and Chicago controlled a significant proportion of the national financial
assets.  At the  end of 1982,  the  ten largest banks controlled 23 percent
of the total  liabilities of all commercial banks  in  the U.S.  However,
basic financial  services were readily available  in even small communities
in the rest of the country.8 Many Midwestern states  retained unit
banking or  restrictive branching laws  so  communities had locally-owned
and controlled banks.  Even  in states  that permitted bank branching, the
prohibition on interstate branching kept bank operations confined within
state boundaries and guaranteed a distinctly local  character to financial
markets.
6  Merris and Wood (1985)  argue that developments  in U.S.  financial
markets  since deregulation are  a continuation of patterns evidenced
before regulation in  the 1930s.  There  is  still an active debate on the
supposed instability of banking before regulation.  (e.g. see  Rolnick and
Weber, 1985)
7  This  is  still true  in the mid-1980s even though  there has been a
increase  in the number of very large  institutions.  The  total number of
banks  in  the country declined from 14,208  in 1981  to  13,916  in  1985.
About 84 percent of commercial banks  are considered small with assets
under $100 million.  About 53  percent of the  3,200  thrifts have under
$100  million in assets.
8  As of December 1984,  there were 7,900  rural banks, and 5,157
agricultural banks of which 4,523 were also rural.  Banks were classified
as rural  if the headquarters were  located in a nonmetropolitan county.
Agricultural banks had more  than the national  average  of 17  percent of
the loan portfolio in agricultural  loans.  (Gajewski, 1986, p. 4)8
Some argued that small  institutions  survived and prospered under  the
old system of regulation because  of limitations on competition, regulated
prices,  and branching restrictions.  Proponents  of  deregulation argued
that small  institutions would survive even  if the restrictions were
lifted.  Small financial  institutions have not  disappeared during the  six
years since deregulation, but larger institutions have generally been
more profitable and have grown faster.9 The conventional wisdom that
small banks are  as  efficient as  large banks may not be  true.  There are
reasons  to believe  that  larger financial institutions will become even
more  important  in the  future.
With only a few exceptions, a generation of cost studies  showed that
U.S. banks  did not  exhibit significant economies  of scale.1 0 The
evidence  suggested that community institutions were efficient and could
survive and profit after deregulation.  However, there were problems with
past cost studies  that make projection to  the  future questionable.  Past
studies found there were not significant  economies of scale in providing
basic financial  services.  Previous  cost  studies have not controlled for
variation in output mix by bank type  e.g. corporate versus  farm banks.
9  Larger banks have maintained their pre-1980 income  levels,  but
small banks, with assets  of less  than $100 million, have not.  Since
about 84 percent of banks  are  "small,"  average bank income has  fallen
since deregulation  (Fortier and Phillis,  1985,  p. 66).  The total  income
of federally insured commercial banks declined in 1986  for  the  first time
in 25  years.  (Wall Street Journal, March 19,  1987)
10  The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta published a collection of
studies on the economies  of scale of banking in Nov. 1982.  Those  studies
showed there was not a large advantage  for  size above some  threshold
level of deposits, usually about $25  million.  One study in that
collection found evidence  of disadvantages  to  "bigness".  (Benston,
Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1982)  Other studies  found there was not  a
significant difference between unit operating  costs  at large  and small
financial institutions.9
Few of the past  studies checked for  the cost savings  from joint
production of a range of financial  services.  There  is  some evidence of
economies  of scope which will be more  important in the  future with a
broader range of financial  services.  Also  the results  of past cost
studies may no  longer be valid because of the changing technology in  the
financial sector.  There has been rapid technical development in  some of
the  support services  for banking, especially computer and communication
technology.  While recent  improvements have made automated equipment more
easily divisible, there are still indivisibilities.  Only the most recent
cost studies have examined technological change or  economies  of scope and
some have found a cost advantage for  large banks.11
The market structure  of the past was characterized by highly
concentrated banking markets at  the  local level.  Concentration  in local
markets has been decreasing since  the  early 1970s,  and may decrease
further if  large banking systems continue to  expand into new market
areas.12 This will mean less  control and market power for local banks.
However, this  does not mean that smaller financial institutions will
disappear.  Small community financial institutions are expected to
survive even with growing concentration  in national financial markets.
There will  still be a niche  for providing localized or  specialized
financial services, but that niche may not be as profitable as  in the
past.  While some financial  services can be provided through nation-wide
11  e.g.  Shay and Lawrence, 1986,  Hunter and Timme,  1986  and Kolari
and Zardkoohi,  1987.  The evidence  on economies of scope is  not
conclusive yet.
12  Concentration in  local banking markets, in general,  decreased
from 1970  to  1983.  (Evanoff and Fortier,  1986)10
networks,  such as  deposit-taking or credit cards,  loan evaluation remains
a labor-intensive activity dependent on local knowledge.  However,
community institutions may have to  be more  efficiently managed and expand
services to  survive in  the face  of competition.  For  example,  in a survey
of Wisconsin banks  done at  the  time  of deregulation, Taff,  Pulver, and
Staniforth found that many small banks were not prepared to  make complex
business loans  and lacked experience  in recruiting nonlocal funds.13
Small banks may have  to  develop new expertise  or develop  linkages  to
institutions with that expertise to  survive.  There  are ways  for small
financial institutions  to  purchase  rather than produce some services.
There are wholesalers  that provide financial and information services
that  cannot be  efficiently produced in small  institutions,  e.g. banker's
banks.  Another possibility for maintaining local control  is  to move  to a
system of franchises, with local  institutions operating under  the name
and with the  support of a national system.
Therefore  the best "guess" for future market structure  is  that many
local  institutions will develop  closer working relationships with
regional and national  systems,  and the  large systems will grow in
importance.  The possibility of exploiting the new technologies  and
advantages  of size will be even more  important as  interstate  systems
spread.
Geographic Restrictions
National deregulation did not remove the restrictions  on interstate
13  Taff, Pulver, and Staniforth,  1984.11
and intrastate expansion by banks.14 Location restrictions were left
under the control  of state governments. 15 Most  states have  acted  in the
last few years  to  reduce in-state branching restrictions  and are  now
negotiating multi-state banking arrangements.16 By early 1987,  36  states
had passed some form of  interstate banking legislation.17 Several states
have allowed entrance to  financial markets  tied to  job creation or
economic development targets.  Many states have adopted regional compacts
to allow reciprocal  entry from neighboring states.  There  are multi-state
banking regions  already functioning in New England and the Southeast.
Interstate banking is  not entirely new in the  1980s  and many types
of interstate activity can already be found in  the banking community.
Even without interstate banking laws,  there  are  six methods  for acquiring
a bank in another  state and six additional methods  for providing banking
services across  state boundaries without owning a bank in the  state being
14  The laws  on interstate expansion by thrifts were not as
restrictive as  the laws  for banks.  However the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board rarely permitted interstate expansion, except in supervisory cases.
After April 24,  1986,  the  Federal Home Loan Bank Board policy changed to
allow chartered thrifts  to branch across state  lines  in regions covered
by multi-state bank and thrift compacts.
15  Under the McFadden Act of 1927  and the Banking Act of 1933
nationally-chartered banks were  subject to  the branching laws of the home
state.  Under the Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, bank holding companies could acquire banks  in another state only if
the  laws of that state permitted the acquisition.  Most states restricted
entrance of institutions  from out-of-state and many states  restricted the
branching activities of in-state institutions.
16  The number of states permitting either statewide  or  limited
branching rose from 33  in 1960  to 43  in 1983.  The number of unit bank
states declined from 18  to 8 during the  same period.
17  Midwestern states  that have approved some form of regional
interstate banking legislation include Illinois,  Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Wisconsin.12
served.18  With the exception of interstate branching to  acquire  failed
institutions, 19 the  other mechanisms  for branching across state  lines
existed, and were used, before  the banking laws were changed.  An April
1987  Supreme Court decision,  in effect, allowed the  continued interstate
spread of nonbank banks.  Even though it  is  doubtful  that interstate
banking will have  a direct  impact  in smaller banking markets  soon,
particularly in the  less  lucrative markets  in rural areas,  even areas
that  do not adopt interstate  legislation will feel  some  influence from
out-of-state banking systems.  The  growth of regional or national systems
under interstate banking will  reinforce the  trends  discussed in the
previous  sections  towards  larger financial systems,  and more  system
affiliation.
Ownership  and Bank Performance
Changing technology may be making larger systems profitable and
state laws  are  allowing such systems, but  it  is  not clear how this will
affect the pricing and availability of services.  There have been several
attempts  to  test how the performance of locally-owned banks differ from
system banks.  Most of the studies  done  to  date have relied on the
comparison of financial ratios  and cannot be considered valid tests  of
18  Banks  can acquire across  state  lines  if explicitly permitted by state  law, under the  grandfather clause of the  1956 Bank Holding Company Act,  to acquire a failing bank or  thrift under  the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, under international banking provisions,  and as  chain banks  owned by individuals rather  than corporations.  Banking services can be provided across state  lines by nonbank subsidiaries  of bank holding
companies,  nonbank banks,  loan production offices,  franchise  agreements, ATM networks,  and direct mail.  (Duwe, 1986, pp.  1-11.)
19  In  the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982,  the FDIC and FSLIC were authorized to  accept bids  for failed institutions  across  state lines  if
an acceptable  in-state buyer could not be  found.  This provision has been used aggressively by a few money center banks  to  gain entry  into new markets.13
the hypothesis  that bank performance varies with ownership. 20 Given the
results available  at  this juncture, it is  not possible  to generalize
about  the relationship between ownership  and performance.  Also, it would
be hard to project  from past studies because financial markets are
changing rapidly and earlier studies may tell us  little about  the  future.
The debate on system versus  independent banks seems  to  center on the
costs and benefits of facilitating  flows of funds.  Larger banking
systems  offer the potential benefits  of achieving economies  of scale and
scope and portfolio diversification.  A priori, it seems  that financial
systems can diversify across markets and therefore be  "less conservative"
in lending within any given local market. 21 But the  option of
diversifying a portfolio across areas  and sectors  also  raises the  fear  of
funds  flowing out of local areas.  The flow of funds  from rural  to urban
areas  through banking networks has been a particularly sensitive  issue.
Even before  the  change in regulation there were massive interregional
flow of funds  in this country.  Markets and instruments were already
available  to  facilitate interregional  transfers, regardless  of the
ownership  or affiliation of local  financial institutions.
20  A different approach was reported by Struck and Mandell.  A  1980 survey of small businesses  found that businesses  located in unit branching states were more  likely to perceive that their credit needs were met than in  states  that permitted branching or multibank holding companies.  While  the survey found a perceived difference  in availability of credit,  there was not a difference in  terms of lending  to  small
businesses.  (Struck and Mandell, 1983)
21  Tentative  support for  this  finding cited in Markley, 1985,  p. 14.  Also  in the  1986  Economic Report of the President  the government-
sponsored credit programs were justified with the argument that geographic restrictions  on bank branching restricted the  ability of private financial markets  to  diversify portfolio  risk as well as  a national program.14
Integration of National Financial Markets
Even before deregulation, market forces  and institutional
innovations had integrated national financial markets.  During the 1960s
and 1970s individuals had started arbitraging interest rate  differentials
directly.  During several periods.after 1966,  the real  interest rate paid
on Regulation Q savings  deposits was negative, leading to  a flow of  funds
out of commercial banks.  The growing public sensitivity to  interest rate
differentials  initially led to  a shift among local institutions  such as
savings and loan associations and credit unions  that were allowed to  pay
a slightly higher  rate on savings accounts and later to  inter-regional
flows of funds  as  a response  to  differences  in interest  rates.  National
competition for deposits was  spearheaded by  the spread of NOW accounts  in
New England after 1976,  followed by money market mutual funds  offered by
brokerage houses and nondepository institutions.22  Another alternative
to  reliance  on local banking markets  came from nation-wide credit card
systems  as  a partial substitute for non-interest bearing checking
accounts at commercial banks.
The growing competition for deposits had spread into rural  areas  by
the mid-1970s.  Rural banks were  forced to compete  in interest rates and
deposit structure to  hold the local  deposit base.  The  interest
differential between rural and urban areas narrowed.  After six-month
money market certificates were  introduced on June  1, 1978, rural banks
used this  interest-sensitive liability to hold funds.  Adjusting for
22  Money market mutual  funds,  introduced in 1974,  grew rapidly
after 1978  as  savers  transferred funds  out  of regulated interest
accounts.  After money market deposit accounts  (MMDA)  were offered by
banks  on Dec.  14,  1982  and Super NOW accounts as  of Jan. 5, 1983  the
phenomenal  growth in MMMF slowed.15
differences  in size,  metro and nonmetro  banks held about the  same
percentage of interest-sensitive deposits. 23 By mid-1981,  thirty percent
of the deposits of agricultural banks were in six-month money market
certificates and rural banks were  also paying market rates  on the 30-
month small saver certificates  and large CD's.2 4
It  is  hard to  evaluate regional differentials  in  lending rates
because of differences  in  industrial concentration, credit needs,  and
concomitant differences  in maturity, collateral, and risk.  One study
done  shortly before deregulation found a "national"  commercial  lending
market.2 5 However, another  study done  in the early  1980s found  there
were still regional differentials  in mortgage  lending rates.2 6 In
certain areas  there  are now sizeable deviations  in  lending rates from
national  trends because of recent  loan losses, small  inefficient banks
operating without  competition, etc.  However these  cases  represent
exceptions with the  rule being loose conformity to national  trends  in
lending rates.
The rapid development of inter-bank and secondary financial markets
during the  1960s  and 1970s further  integrated U.S.  financial markets.
The net  flow of funds  from rural  to  urban areas  through federal  funds
markets had been documented since the early 1970s.27  This was  part of
the net  flow from small  to  large banks.  On average, both metro  and
23  Milkove,  1985,  p. 3.
24  Melichar, 1983,  p. 20.
25  Osborne,  1983.
26  Morrell and Saba,  1983.
27  e.g. Shane, 1975.16
nonmetro banks with assets of under $500 million were net  sellers of
federal  funds  in 1981  to  banks with assets  over  $500  million.2 8 Use of
inter-bank markets to  place surplus  funds  drew small  rural markets  into
closer alignment with national financial market trends.
Therefore even though the physical market structure  at  the time  of
deregulation still  "looked"  localized, most  local units were linked  into
national networks.  Deregulation not only strengthened those linkages,
but made  it  impossible to  avoid the competitive  forces  that integrate  the
system.29 Local financial institutions  that compete for deposits can no
longer afford to operate  a lending policy independent of national market
trends.
Integration of financial markets  and interregional  funds  flows will
not always work against rural areas.  One  study found that multi-branch
banking also facilitated intrarural flows  so  that rapidly growing rural
areas benefitted.30 There  is  no way  to  generalize about whether an area
will be  a net supplier or  recipient of  funds without examining local
market conditions.
Changing Financial Market Practices
Volatile macroeconomic conditions, especially credit risk and
interest rate fluctuations, have  forced most  financial  institutions to
adopt new operating practices.  This  process  started with rapid inflation
in the  1970s  and sped up  after deregulation removed pricing and product
28  Milkove,  1985, pp.  3-4.
29  This discussion focused on integration of national  financial
markets  in the  1960s  and 1970s.  By a similar, albeit slower process,  the
capital markets of the  industrialized economies are now being linked.
30  Barkley, et al,  1984.17
restrictions.  Just a few years ago most consumers had an established
relationship with a local bank covering the basic  financial services.
Maintaining a non-interest bearing checking account usually entitled the
customer  to  free  checking, and other free services  such as  funds
transfers, cashier checks, and some business advice.  In exchange for
loyal patronage,  customers  also qualified for occasional loans.
Established borrowers had automatic  lines  of credit.  The nature of the
customer relationship with financial institutions has  changed in the
1980s  and the  traditional relationship built on cheap deposits,
subsidized services  and credit  is no longer guaranteed.
The DIDMCA of 1980 mandated that deposit  interest ceilings were to
be phased out over a six-year period ending  in mid-1986.  In addition,
the  1980  law allowed all depository institutions  to  offer checking
accounts which increased competition for deposits.  Banks no longer have
a guaranteed supply  of cheap "core  deposits" held in checking accounts.
Under price deregulation, financial institutions  are expected to
"unbundle" and explicitly price financial  services.  Complementary
services are no  longer part  of the compensation  for holding non-interest
bearing checking deposits.  Service fees are a growing source of income
for financial institutions.31
31  Noninterest income  as a percent of  average net assets of insured
commercial banks has risen steadily since deregulation from  .90  in 1981
to  1.03  in 1983  to 1.31  in  1985.  (Danker and McLaughlin,  1986, p. 618.)
Noninterest income, which includes  fee  income and off-balance sheet
activities,  is  higher for non-agricultural banks  than agricultural banks
in  the Midwest.  "Other" income at non-agricultural banks  in the Midwest
rose from  .77  in 1980  to  1.09 in 1985.  At agricultural banks  other
income rose from  .37 in 1980  to  .46 in 1985.  (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Macroreport)18
The pricing of financial products now not only reflect the  cost of
the service but also  interest rate risk.  The need to  deal with interest
rate risk has  spawned new financial instruments.  As  we moved from
negative real  interest rates  in the  1970s  to high real  interest rates  in
the  1980s,  financial  institutions,had to worry more about  the gap  in
maturity and interest sensitivity between the asset and liability  sides
of the balance  sheet.  One of the most common tools  in managing interest-
rate risk now is variable rate  lending.32 Loan maturities have  also been
shortened and new secondary markets have been developed to help bankers
allocate interest rate risk.
Changes  in operating practices  of financial institutions have
redistributed costs and benefits  through  the system with new pricing
arrangements.  The changes have generally benefitted savers by allowing
them to  earn a rate more responsive  to  market interest rates.  Ideally,
competition among institutions  should provide  savers with a range of
savings  instruments with differing combinations  of minimum balance,
service fees,  interest rates, withdrawal  fees,  etc.  However some  of this
product differentiation may be trivial  rather than substantive,  leaving
consumers to  chose among a confusing range of accounts.
Financial  institutions  are expected to  "rationalize"  pricing as
services  are  separately priced.  This will offer the  opportunity for  cost
savings  for  some businesses.  Other businesses will pay more  as  cross
subsidization is  reduced.  Businesses should have  the advantage  of more
32  In April 1981  the  FHLBB authorized thrifts  to  offer adjustable
mortgage loans,  including adjustable  rate mortgages.  By 1984 the percent
of thrift assets in variable rate mortgage instruments had increased to
22  from 1.4 in  1980.  (Fortier and Phillis,  1985, p. 65)19
competition among service providers, but information and search costs may
be  significant.
Evaluating the  changes in  financial markets  for borrowers  is  more
difficult.  There have been changes in both the pricing and availability
of commercial credit.  Borrowers no  longer have the benefit of the
artificially  low rates common during the years when banks had access  to
free funds held in checking accounts.  Borrowers  have also had to  assume
more interest-rate risk with variable rate loans.  In addition to changes
in pricing, many borrowers are  finding new problems with the availability
of credit.  The extreme cases have been in the  sectors suffering high
default risk e.g. agriculture, energy and real estate.  It may be harder
to  establish  "creditworthiness" for some types  of business.
Efficiency and Equity Since Deregulation
Deregulation of financial markets was to  promote efficiency by
replacing legislative discretion with market forces  driven by
competition.  In sweeping terms,  the competitive delivery system and new
practices  should allow greater efficiency in pricing, movement of funds,
and product development.  The integration of national markets has
facilitated the  flow of funds  to  productive areas  and projects.  (Of
course,  it also  facilitates  the flow of funds  to  high risk banks willing
to rely on borrowed funds.)  Larger systems can diversify portfolios
across regions and sectors.  There has been a proliferation of new
products and services  tailored to  specialized needs.  Deregulation has
also moved the financial system towards a more rational pricing  system
with explicit pricing of services and more  financial contracts tied to
the prevailing market rate of interest, the  signals that should be used20
for  savings and investment decisions.  Weak financial institutions have
been closed and then placed with new management.  While there  are  obvious
exceptions  to  these  simplistic generalizations,  the evaluation'of the
changes  in  financial markets during the  1980s and the  contribution of
deregulation to  efficiency has generally not been negative.  However  the
incentives  for efficiency  in the financial  service industry are  still
weak in some areas.
The competition that  is  to  drive financial  institutions  towards
lower cost production of financial  services is  more likely to be
evidenced in money centers  and among larger institutions.  Many areas of
the Midwest have low population densities  and few financial institutions.
Some  counties may have  as  few as  three or  four banks.  Spatially
dispersed service centers and high transaction costs  leave significant
concentration and market power  in local  financial markets and may account
for  some  of the observed variation in  lending rates.33 Many small
localized banking markets are not  exposed to  much direct competition,
have been slow to adopt new technology or practices,  and have been slow
to move  to  the greater efficiency that was suppose  to  come with
deregulation.  Therefore the rating on efficiency might be mixed
depending on the level  of  the system examined.  Many areas have yet to
3 For example, a survey of farm credit done  early in  1987 found
considerable variation in interest rates on farm loans  at banks.  The
generalization formerly used was  that large bank farm loan rates  tended
to  follow the national prime  rate while the lending rate  at  small banks
reflected the average  internal cost of funds.  Since  the introduction of
interest sensitive deposit  instruments, the  lending rate on farm loans at
small banks has become more closely linked to  the national prime  rate;
but is  still more stable  than the lending rate  at large banks.
(Melichar, 1987)21
reap  the benefits of efficiency promised under deregulation.
Changing practices  in financial markets  have raised concern about
equity and fairness.  The changes  in financial markets  in recent years
have redistributed costs and benefits among savers,  consumers of
services,  and borrowers.  The  introduction of market-responsive deposit
rates on most accounts,  the move  from cross-subsidization to  explicit
pricing of services, use  of new instruments  to pass  interest-rate  risk
back to  borrowers, etc. have effected almost everyone who uses  the
financial system.  In  some cases the  redistribution has been considered
undesirable and inconsistent with other public objectives,  such as  access
to banking services  for  low income  individuals.
It  is  clear that changes  in financial services have redistributed
costs and benefits among users, but  it  is not clear that the  changes will
make much difference in inter-regional  growth patterns.  There  is
variation in the pricing and availability of services among communities
and regions depending on the  efficiency of the  financial  institution and
the health of the local economy.  Given the density of financial
institutions, growing consumer sophistication and the  forces  of
competition, price differentials on basic services  should not be great,
but differences will exist.  However,  it  is  unlikely that differences in
financial  services will contribute much to variation in interregional
growth rates.  There does  not seem to be a strong relationship between
activities  of financial institutions and regional  economic growth
patterns, but  this observation is  still open for debate.
There  is  an unresolved debate on the nature  of the  interactions
between real and financial activities  in economic development.  Some22
believe  that the  activities  of financial institutions can affect  the
general health and growth of  the  local economy.  It  is  argued that
bankers can promote  the local economy by funding new business ventures
plus providing financial services  for on-going businesses,  and providing
consumer credit to support  sales.,  Some maintain bankers who  refuse to
take  risks in the  local  economy choke-off the growth potential of the
area.34 However, this view has been challenged by the  argument that the
roles of financial institutions  and credit in economic growth have been
overrated.
Those who oppose the  emphasis  given to  financial institutions  argue
that financial  services are just  one of a range  of services needed for
business  success and that  too much attention is  focused on credit while
neglecting entrepreneurial, marketing, or  other functions.  Furthermore
financial institutions provide  only a limited portion of the  credit
available through formal and informal channels.  It can also be argued
that local economic conditions  are swamped by broader national economic
3 A  few studies have supported  the belief that the  activities of
financial institutions  can stimulate  local economic  conditions.  Ho  and
Shaffer used a simultaneous equation system of local income and bank
performance measures to  study the  relationship  in Wisconsin counties  for
the period 1969  to  1973.  They concluded that bank lending had a positive
impact on per capita  income change.23
forces  and even good financial services can do  little  to  change  the
growth prospects of a community.35
It  is  easy to  point to  case studies  to support  either of these
viewpoints.  Attempts  to  examine  the relationship between bank activities
and local economic performance  empirically have not had consistent
findings  and have not resolved the uncertainty.  While researchers
continue  to grapple with the  issue of how to measure the  interaction
between real and financial  flows,  the public will continue  to  focus on
the availability of credit.
Availability of loans, will remain a sensitive political  issue  in
evaluation of the  financial system on a community level.  Ideally,  the
financial system should be capable of  channeling credit across  regions to
the most productive projects.  It  is  not clear that our,  or  any other,
financial system does  a good job of credit allocation.  Without objective
standards,  it  is  very difficult  to evaluate  the credit allocation
process.  Simple  indicators of  financial institution performance  are
frequently misleading.  For example a low loan-to-deposit  ratio may
35  Barkley and Helander examined time-series  data on bank lending
and retail sales  for  27  communities  in Arizona.  Using Granger and Sims
tests  for causality, they found that economic activity leads bank
lending.  The authors concluded that while banks  obviously facilitate
growth, banks  do not  initiate the growth process.  (Barkley and Helander,
1985.)  It should be noted that retail sales may be a weak measure of
economic activity.  Additional indirect support for  the argument that
local bank performance  is  not a primary determinant of economic activity
comes from a study by Milkove and Weisblat.  That study used data on non-
urban areas in the mid-1970s and found a relationship between structure
and performance  in rural financial markets but not between structure of
the banking market and local economic growth measured by employment
growth.  The authors pointed out  that this  finding was consistent with
the existence  of national capital markets  so  that local units were not
exclusively dependent on local  financial markets.  (Milkove and Weisblat,
1982)24
indicate a reasonable strategy to protect deposit funds  and control
lending risk  in an undiversified agricultural area rather  than an overly
conservative lending policy.  A  large number of  credit denials may be
based on the correct assessment of poor  local economic conditions.
Similarly a higher  interest rate for small businesses may be a realistic
reflection of default risk rather than discrimination.  Of more concern
are  arbitrary credit allocation decisions  that  do not correctly reflect
expected profitability or risk.3 6
Credit market  imperfections are probably much rarer than the public
perceives,  since many loan rejections can be traced to high credit risk.
However, there are significant  "gaps"  in  financing.  Financial
institutions frequently do a poor job in assessing the creditworthiness
of new businesses, 37 service  firms without  tangible collateral, very
small businesses, and very rapidly growing firms.  In some areas of the
country and with some products, venture capital sources may be available
to  fill  these gaps.  While there  are some venture capitalists operating
in  the Midwest, activities  are not geographically dispersed and they
36  If discriminatory credit allocation decisions  can be documented,
an individual does have  some protection under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.  If  there are blatant credit allocation problems  in a
community, such as  redlining certain neighborhoods,  these  can be brought
to  the attention of regulators  under the Community Reinvestment Act.
However the  legal  recourse  for arbitrary credit allocation decision is
very weak.
37  A survey of small Wisconsin firms  found that owners'  savings,
funds  from friends and relatives, and loans  from commercial banks were
the major source of funds  for new businesses.  (Combs, Pulver, and
Shaffer,  1983).  Another survey showed that most startups and small
operations relied on owners'  capital, although the definition of this
term was somewhat ambiguous.  (University of Michigan, 1985).  For a
survey of small business finance,  see  The State of Small Business,  1986,
Chapter 2.25
rarely lend  in smaller communities.38 State and community economic
development  funds have been developed to  fill  financing  "gaps."  While an
evaluation of these funding schemes  is beyond the scope of this paper,  it
can be noted that many schemes have discovered that loan losses tend to
be very high in the  areas where formal financial institutions  are
unwilling to  lend.
After deregulation there has been less  leverage to  impose equity
objectives and the view that financial institutions should be  evaluated
as  a "public utility" has  less  credibility.  The move to  "level the
playing field" among financial  institutions  reduced the privileges  for
commercial banks.  Since banks  are no longer protected from competition,
there may be  less  "slack"  to contribute  to public  service and banks may
feel less  obligation to perform a public  service role.
It  is  too  early to make blanket statements  about efficiency and
equity with partially deregulated financial markets.  The system is  still
evolving.  However, early efficiency gains  attributed to  deregulation
have been tempered with the  fear that deregulation has  contributed to
instability in  financial system during the  1980s.
Stability and Financial Institution Failures
Bank and thrift failures  or forced mergers are now a familiar part
of the  economic landscape.  This stands  in sharp  contrast with the pre-
1980  record.  Between 1947 and 1980,  there was an average of  6.4  insured
bank failures per year.  The number of failures  started to rise  in the
mid-1970s,  with an average of  12.9  failures per year  from 1975  into  the
early 1980s.  The increase after 1981 was  startling.  There were  10 bank
38  Hustedde and Pulver,  1985.26
failures  in 1981, 42  in  1982,  48  in  1983,  79  in  1984, 120  in 1985,  and
138  in  1986.39 Forty banks  failed in  the first quarter of 1987.
Financial problems in  thrifts  started earlier and were severe  in  the
early  1980s.  Only 130 thrifts  failed from 1934, when deposit insurance
was  introduced by FSLIC,  until 1980.  Between 1980  and 1985,  581
federally insured S & Ls  failed.  In  1986, 21  savings and loans were
closed, 43 were  forced to  change management and 22  were forced to merge
with stronger institutions.  While  the number of S & L failures has
declined since the high of 252  in 1982,  and the  interest rate  environment
for thrifts has  improved since  1981, there are still several hundred
thrifts close to  insolvency and the  FSLIC does  not have  the  funds  to
close all  the  insolvent  thrifts. 40
There  is  considerable debate about the causes of the  rash of
financial institution failures.  Several characteristics of the
macroeconomic environment during the  1980s have increased the  risk of
financial institutions:  volatile interest rates;  "boom and bust"
problems in several  sectors  of the economy such as  agriculture and
energy;  and the repayment problems of Third World debtors.  These  factors
eroded the profit margins of some  institutions  and undoubtedly
3 In 1986  there were  26 bank failures  in Texas,  16  in Oklahoma,  14
in Kansas,  10 in  Iowa, 9 in Missouri,  8 in California and Louisiana, 7 in
Colorado and Wyoming, 6 in Nebraska,  5 in Minnesota, and one  in South
Dakota and Wisconsin.
40  As  of June  1985 there were  88  thrifts with total  assets of $16.8
billion with negative net worth by regulatory accounting principles.  By
generally accepted accounting principles,  461 thrifts with total assets
of $111.4 billion had negative  net worth.  (Economic Report  of the
President,  1986,  p. 205.)  The situation has  deteriorated since that
time.  Nearly one of every four  federally insured S & Ls  lost money in
1986.  Losses by unprofitable S & Ls  rose from $3.6 billion in  1985  to
$8.3  billion in  1986.27
contributed to weakness  in the  system.
In the Midwest we are  especially aware of the problems of
agricultural banks.  There has been a dramatic reversal  for agricultural
banks41 since the  1970s when financing agriculture was highly lucrative.
The  rate of return on equity earned by agricultural banks peaked in  1980
and has  declined every year since  then.  The  return on assets  at the  2200
agricultural banks  in the four midwestern Federal Reserve districts,
Chicago, Minneapolis,  St.  Louis,  and Kansas City, dropped to  .33  in  1985
and  .29  in 1986.  That was about one-third of the  1979 rate.
Agricultural banks relied heavily on gains  in security trading for  income
in  1985 and 1986.  The return on assets, net of security gains,  was only
.20 in  1985 and  .07  in 1986.42  There were some  indicators  that  the  loan-
losses of agricultural banks started to  stabilize  towards the  end of
1986.4 3
Many of the banks  that have  failed, have been heavily involved in
agricultural or  energy finance.  Of the  239 commercial bank failures
between 1983 and 1985,  137 were  rural banks and 107  specialized in
financing agriculture.  There were 68  agricultural bank failures  in 1986,
41  These banks represent  15  percent of  all U.S. banks but less  than
five percent of all U.S. banking assets.  The Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago defines agricultural banks as  banks with at  least 30  percent of
total loans  to agriculture.  (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
"Macroreport".)
42  Even with bond trading profits and tax credits,  23  percent of
the  agricultural banks  in  the four midwestern Federal Reserve districts
lost money in 1985,  compared with 14 percent in 1984 and only one percent
in 1980.  The definition of an agricultural banks used by the Chicago
Federal Reserve Bank is  at  least 30  percent of total loans  to
agriculture.  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  "Macroreport",  1985.
43  Melichar  (1987).28
the  same number as  in 1985.  The problem of failing banks was
particularly severe in the grain producing areas  of the Midwest.  Half of
all bank failures  from 1983  to  1985 were  in  the Northern Plains  and the
Corn Belt44 and that area had three-fifths  of the  rural bank failures and
three-quarters  of the agricultural bank failures. 45
Besides the volatile macroeconomic  conditions,  there have been
changes endogenous  to  the financial  sector which may have escalated
failures.  There has been an explicit change  in regulatory policy since
deregulation to  use market forces  to  "weed out"  weaker financial
institutions.  In practice, this policy has been applied to  smaller
financial institutions, but regulators have not been as  anxious to  see
"market forces"  close  larger banks.  Therefore a change  in regulatory
practice explains why small financial  institutions  that get  in trouble
have not been "bailed out".
Aggressive competition and new activities have  also been cited as
causes of financial institution failures.  Many financial  institutions
have  taken advantage  of deregulation  to move  into more  risky
44  The Northern Plains includes  South and North Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas.  The Corn Belt covers  Iowa,  Illinois,  Indiana, Ohio,  and Missouri.
45  A larger proportion of bank failures  in 1985 were rural
agricultural banks  than in  1983.  Almost 70 percent of the  failed banks in 1985 were  rural banks, up  from 34 percent in 1983;  and more  than 55 percent were agricultural banks, up from 16  percent in 1983.  Here agricultural banks  are defined as  banks with over 17  percent of total loans  to agriculture.  (Gajewski, 1986,  p. 2 and p. 5)  While the number of agricultural bank failures  remained constant in  1985 and 1986,  these represented a smaller proportion of the national total in  1986.29
activities.4 6 There has been more direct  lending4 7 more off-balance
sheet activities,  etc.48 The  flat-rate deposit  insurance schemes of FDIC
and FSLIC do not force financial  institutions  to pay a higher premium on
more risky activities.  In addition, poor management, frequently coupled
with illegal  activities, has been a factor  in many, if not most,
failures. 49
The  impact on the  local community of a financial  institution failure
has been mitigated by government intervention.  At  least so  far,  few
failed financial  institutions have been closed for more than a few days.
Usually the  institutions  are  taken-over immediately by healthy
46  For example, Marcus  (1984) argues that deregulation lowered the
value of a bank charter by easing entry, making high-risk strategies more
attractive.
4 This trend pre-dates deregulation.  Loans as a percentage of
bank earning assets rose from 21 percent in  1945  to  61 percent  in 1960,
70 percent  in 1970,  73  percent in 1980,  and 78 percent  in 1984.  (Merris
and Wood, 1985, p.  70)  This generalization has not held true  for
Midwestern agricultural banks  in recent years because of weak loan
demand.  For example net loans  as  a percent of total  assets fell  from
50.3  in 1984  to  45.1  in mid-1986.  (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
"Macroreport")
48  Financial institutions have moved more activities  "off balance
sheet"  to avoid regulatory scrutiny and to circumvent the  capital
standards.  There has been a dramatic  increase in  "off-balance  sheet"
activities,  such as  loan commitments,  lines of credit, bankers
acceptances, financial  futures,  forward transactions,  and stand-by
letters  of credit.  These new activities have not been closely monitored
by regulators yet and may represent greater risk for financial
institutions.
4 Several studies  on bank failures are reviewed in  the Nov. 1983
issue  of Economic Review prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.30
institutions with assistance  from FDIC or  FSLIC. 50 There  is  no  threat to
the security of deposits under  $100,000 because of deposit insurance  from
FDIC  or  FSLIC.  However, there  is  no  guarantee  of continuing service  to
borrowers after the  failure of a financial  institution.  The FDIC or
FSLIC may not be able  to  find a buyer willing to  assume all outstanding
loans.51
As mentioned before, the regulators have been more reluctant to
allow large banks  to fail.  About 80  percent of the banks  that failed
between 1982  and 1985 had assets of less  than $50  million;  fewer than 5
percent were "large" with assets of over $300 million.52  Therefore the
rash of bank failures has not been seen as  a threat to the  stability of
the national  financial system.  Of more  immediate concern are  the
solvency of the deposit insurance  schemes and regulatory reform to
stabilize remaining institutions.
The potential budgetary costs  of financial  institution failures
looms large with the solvency of  the insurance  schemes, particularly the
FSLIC,  in question.  Several hundred thrifts have  negative net worth or
are near  insolvency.  It has been estimated that  the  cost of closing
insolvent thrifts would be  as high as $22.5 billion against the reserves
50  Of  the 239 bank failures between 1983  and 1985, 185 were passed
to new owners under purchase and assumption agreements.  In an additional
21  cases the deposits  and some of the assets  of the  failed bank were
passed to  a healthy bank under an FDIC arranged deposit transfer
arrangement.
51  FDIC has been more  aggressive lately in negotiating with bank
buyers  to assume all outstanding loans.
52  Gajewski,  1986, p. 4.31
of $4.6 billion held by the FSLIC to  deal with failing institutions.53
The conditions  for federal budget intervention in the deposit  insurance
schemes have not been worked out yet, but  there  is  little doubt  that
FSLIC will need federal assistance.
There  are several  options now under discussion to discipline  the
risk-taking activities  of financial  institutions in an attempt to
stabilize  the system.54 There are  three general  approaches under
consideration:  to  raise the required capital  standards  for financial
institutions engaged in more  risky activities;  to  adjust deposit
insurance premiums  for risk;  and to  shift more  responsibility for
monitoring the risk of financial  institutions to  the public.  Clearly the
impending reform of deposit  insurance and regulatory policy will have a
major impact on providers  and users of financial  services  since  the
reforms will  determine which institutions survive,  the pricing, security
and availability of services, and the division of responsibility for
monitoring between the public  and the regulators.  Reform of the  deposit
insurance schemes will also  have to  confront  the  issue of which
institutions are  to  be  insured.
Porous Boundaries  and Increasing Competition
There  is  still  an unresolved debate on which institutions will be
allowed to  sell  financial  services  and the nature of allowable
competition among financial service providers.  Experimentation and
innovation in financial markets  in the  1960s  and  1970s  included testing
53  Barth et  al,  1986,  p. 38.
54  The proposed reforms in deposit  insurance are  discussed in Wall, 1984,  and the March  1984  issue of Economic Review published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.32
the porous  legal boundaries between financial and nonfinancial firms,
between investment and commercial banking, and between commercial banks
and thrifts.  Existing institutions developed new products or new
institutions were started, to  circumvent the boundaries drawn by past
regulations.  Deregulation did lessen the segmentation among depository
institutions, but did not remove the  explicit barriers between financial
institutions and nonfinancial  firms.
Deregulation attempted to  "level the playing field" among depository
institutions  to  allow broader competition.  For example,  all depository
institutions,  including commercial banks,  savings and loans,  mutual
savings banks, and credit unions, must now meet reserve  requirements with
the Federal Reserve system.  Segmentation of  financial markets by
product-lines was  also reduced somewhat, e.g.,  after 1980 savings and
loans were allowed to  diversify into commercial  and consumer loans,  issue
credit  cards, and accept negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts.
All depository  institutions are now allowed to offer checking accounts,  a
service formerly reserved for commercial banks.
The new regulations increased the  range of potential direct
competition between commercial banks  and thrifts but specialization has
been maintained.  In practice, banks  are still the most diverse financial
institutions with savings and loan associations overwhelmingly33
concentrated in housing finance.55 Only a few savings and loan
associations have moved to become broader-based financial institutions.
Deregulation did'not remove all  institutional segmentation.  Banks  and
thrifts still have some product restrictions, different regulators,  and
different insurance  schemes.
The boundaries between commercial  and investment banking from the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 were  drawn not only to  prevent commercial
banks  from undertaking more risky activities, but also  to restrict
concentration and market power in the financial  sector.  Commercial banks
were limited to deposit-taking and lending while investment banks were
held to underwriting debt and equity issues.  This division was to
prevent the  concentration of both debt and equity finance  in a few "super
banks."  The widespread adoption of the Bank Holding Company structure
allowed commercial banks  to expand into some new activities,  such as
dealing in securities backed by any unit of government.  Deregulation
permitted an even larger menu of activities;  some  overlapping with
investment banks.  Since 1981  commercial banks have started to  provide
55  Both Title  IV of DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Germain Act expanded
the  lending privileges of S & Ls  into consumer and commercial  real
estate.  However, thrifts  (S & Ls  and mutual  savings banks) remain
dependent on mortgage lending.  There has been a decrease  in  the
proportion of assets  in direct mortgage lending from 97.3 percent  in 1975
to  93.4 percent  in 1984;  but much of  the increase  in other  investments
has gone  into mortgage-backed securities.  By June  1984,  the  average
ratio  of consumer loans  to  assets was 3.8 and commercial  loans  to  assets
was  .8 for all thrifts  (Fortier and Phillis,  1985).  The increase  in
commercial lending has been concentrated  in relatively few institutions.
By the  end of 1983,  only 9 percent of the  S & Ls  surveyed in Wisconsin
and Illinois were making commercial  loans and the  end of 1985  this had
only risen to 20 percent.  Most S & Ls  surveyed only planned to  devote  1
or 2 percent of total assets  to commercial  loans.  (Pavel and Phillis,
1985)  More  thrifts have moved into consumer lending.  By  1984,  88.6
percent of all  thrifts were making consumer loans.  (Fortier and Phillis,
1985, p.  65.)34
discount brokerage  services, with about 1,500 banks offering services by
the end of 1983 and 1800 by 1985.  The  SEC estimated that commercial
banks  accounted for about  20 percent  of securities  trading by 1986.56
Commercial banks are  anxious  to move  into several other activities,  such
as underwriting, rather than just placing  commercial paper, mortgage-
related securities not backed by government, municipal revenue bonds,  and
securities backed by consumer receivables  like car loans.  State
governments have some  leeway  in regulating the  services and products
available from state-chartered banks  and several  states have expanded  the
range of allowable activities.  For example, state-chartered banks  in
eleven states,  can engage  in insurance activities which are prohibited to
national banks  and BHCs.  Congress has  debated since  1982, but has  not
yet passed legislation on allowable  activities.  So  far  the changes have
been established in ad hoc regulatory and court rulings on the  state and
national  level.
The U.S.  is  one of the  few countries  that has tried  to  enforce a
strict separation between financial and business  interests.  Deregulation
of the financial industry did not reduce  the boundaries between financial
and non-financial  firms  but again market  forces have poked holes  in  the
wall.  Non-financial firms have purchased nonbank banks  to provide a
limited range of financial services. 57 The Federal Reserve  has tried to
close the nonbank bank loophole  used by commercial  firms  to  enter the
financial  service  sector, but has not been successful.  Also many non-
56  The Wall Street Journal,  Dec.  23,  1986,  p. 44.
57  Nonbanks either offer demand deposits or make commercial  loans, but not both, and therefore are not covered by bank holding company regulations.35
financial firms  have started to  offer a limited range of  financial
services.  Several large retail companies have entered the  financial
service business,  e.g.,  Sears Roebuck and Co.  now owns  Sears Savings
Bank, Allstate Insurance Co.,  the Dean Reynolds securities firm, and is
offering a "Discover" credit card.
The problem of encouraging competition in financial  services while
maintaining boundaries  among commercial banks  and thrifts and investment
banks and commercial ventures was not resolved in the  1980 and 1982
legislation.  While  it  is  widely recognized that the nature of allowable
competition in financial  services needs  to be clarified,  the attempts to
get further national legislation has not been successful yet.  The  issue
of maintaining barriers between commercial and financial  firms  is  closely
tied to  the  issue  of "safety and soundness"  of financial institutions.
First it  is not clear whether expanding into new areas  of business would
increase or  reduce the volatility of earnings for banks  and thrifts.58
Financial institutions have special  government-sponsored mechanisms for
stabilizing the  system i.e.  discount window privileges  and deposit
insurance.  If  these mechanisms are used to  stabilize earnings  across a
broader range of subsidiary activities, financial  firms have  an unfair
competitive advantage  over commercial  firms.  On the other hand, if
engaging in new activities destabilize  the earnings  of financial  firms,
the burden may fall either on the deposit  insurance schemes or  the
government.  Therefore the  issue of allowable activities  and competition
with commercial  firms will have to  be decided in  conjunction with reform
58  The evidence  is  reviewed by Wall and Eisenbeis  (1984) and
Saunders and Smirlock  (1985).36
of the  deposit insurance scheme.
Unless  regulators become  more decisive about drawing and maintaining
the distinction between financial  and non-financial firms,  current
experiments  in the market suggests the  distinction will narrow.  The same
may be  true about  the distinctions among different types  of financial
institutions.  In the near  future we should expect to  see  a debate on the
costs  and benefits of overlapping and potentially competing regulatory
agencies within the financial  sector, and enforced segmentation by
activity.59 Local communities will have a stake  in this  debate since  it
will determine  the structure  and competitiveness  of the  delivery system
for financial  services.  Depending on future  legislation and regulatory
action, we may move  into an era with retail chains  in direct competition
with financial institutions  for providing basic financial  services.  But
it  is  still too  early to  predict what the nature  of competition will be,
or  if  that competition will bring the promised benefits  to  all areas.
Conclusions
The financial  services industry is  being transformed by technical
change, innovation, deregulation, and increasing national and
international competition.  The  importance of deregulation in allowing
the  transformation to proceed rapidly should not be minimized, but many
of the most important forces changing markets  were evident before
5 The  international perspective will undoubtedly enter the  debate on segmentation of financial markets.  In many markets U.S.  banks are  now competing with foreign banks with a different legislative framework. Many American financial  firms are  engaged in activities abroad that are prohibited in  the U.S.  In  the next round of deregulation, the  issue of international competition will be  a more  important issue,  especially  if trade in services  is  liberalized under GATT.37
deregulation.
The trends  discussed in  this paper suggest likely directions  of
change, but  the future  is  far from clear.  The trends,  directions,  and
unresolved issues  will be  reviewed briefly:
1)  Local financial markets have developed close linkages with
national financial markets.  Competition, particularly for
deposits, means  local  institutions cannot deviate much from
national market trends  and have  little  autonomy.
2)  We are already witnessing changes  in the  size distribution and
ownership patterns  of  financial  institutions with growing
importance of large banks and interstate  systems.  It  is  very
difficult to  draw inferences  from either  size or  ownership to
performance.  Under deregulation small banks will be subject to
more competition and may have a cost disadvantage, but small
banks are likely to  survive in the  system and continue to play a
vital  role  in  local communities.
3)  The emphasis  in state  control of geographic restrictions has
changed from unit versus branching restrictions,  to the  timing
and conditions  for interstate entry.  A majority of states have
now entered regional compacts or  allowed some  form of interstate
banking.  The impacts  of this will be  felt  first in the  regional
banking centers.  Increased competition in financial  services
may be slow to come  to  small markets.
4)  Financial market practices have been changing rapidly in
response  to price and product deregulation and the volatile
market environment.  In general, depositors may benefit  as  more38
accounts  pay a market interest rate.  Consumers  of financial
services  should expect to purchase unbundled and explicitly
priced services.  It  is harder to generalize about expected
changes  for borrowers.  Large borrowers can take advantage of
competition.  New, smaller, or  less  creditworthy borrowers  are
likely  to have more difficulty establishing a banking
relationship and signaling creditworthiness.
5)  We  should expect changes in  the policy towards maintaining
"safety and soundness"  in the  financial sector.  Several hundred
financial institutions  are close  to  failure.  Closing these
institutions while protecting depositors will be expensive and
the  insurance  schemes, particularly the FSLIC,  will need federal
funding.  Mispriced deposit  insurance creates problems
throughout the  system and is being reviewed.
6)  Deregulation allowed for  an increase  in competition among
different types of financial  institutions;  but  in practice
segmentation is  still  strong.  There  is  even greater unrealized
potential for  competition in financial services  from commercial
firms.  The issue  of allowable competition between financial  and
commercial firms has not been resolved yet.
Because many of these  changes  are being driven by technology and
macroeconomic conditions,  it would be extremely expensive  to  reimpose
tight regulations on financial institutions.  Many of the  features of the
new financial system are here  to  stay.  However the  transition to a new
financial system is  far from complete.  There are  still many unknowns.
Several critical  issues,  such as  allowable competition and reform of the39
deposit  insurance scheme, must be decided through new legislation or
regulatory action.40
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Appendix:  Midwestern Commercial Banks
The following stylized facts  about Midwestern financial markets were
drawn from the  data prepared for  the  "Macroreport" of the  Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago and cover  the Chicago,  St.  Louis,  Minneapolis,  and Kansas
Federal Reserve districts:
1.  Most small agricultural banks  are  in the Midwest.  Of the  14,331
commercial banks  in  the US,  over  50 percent  (7768)  are  in the Midwest.
Midwestern banks  control about  23 percent of the  total banking assets  in
the US.
Almost seventy percent of the commercial banks  in  the Midwest have
less  than $50 million in assets,  and about 43 percent have less  than $25
million in assets.
Of the  7768 commercial banks  in the Midwest, 2163,  or about 28
percent are agricultural.  Agricultural banks  are defined as banks with
30 percent or more of total loans  to  agriculture.  Over half of  the banks
in Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas,  South Dakota, and North Dakota are classified
as  agricultural under this  definition.
2.  Earnings  of Midwestern commercial banks have declined  in the
1980s.  While the  earnings of agricultural banks were higher than for
small non-agricultural banks during much of  the  1970s,  this has not been
true  during the 1980s.  The rate  of return on assets declined from 1.44
in  1980 for Midwestern agricultural banks  to  a dismal  .29 by end of 1986.
The rate of return on assets for non-agricultural banks started lower at
.92  in 1980  and was  .72 by the end of 1986.  The  rate of return on assets
for non-agricultural Midwestern banks was  above the national average of47
.63  for  1986.  However  the national average was  low last year because  the
severe problems  in the energy  sector.  The average rate of return on
assets  for commercial banks  in  the Dallas Federal Reserve district was  -
.37  for 1986.
Even the  low reported returns on assets for agricultural banks
overstate performance since a significant portion of the  earnings came
from gains  on securities  and use  of tax credits.  For example, at the end
of 1985,  the reported return on assets was  .33,  but net of security gains
it was only  .20.  For 1986  the average return on assets of  .29 was  only
.07 net of security gains.  Non-agricultural banks  also boosted earnings
in 1985 and 1986 with security gains, but not to  the  same extent as
agricultural banks.  For example, at  the  end of 1985,  the rate  of return
on assets for non-agricultural banks was  .71, but only  .66 net of
security gains.  In  1986  subtracting security gains dropped the  return on
assets from  .72 to  .55.
Besides  the decline  in  the average level  of earnings performance for
agricultural banks,  there has been a significant  increase at  the  lower
end of the distribution, with an ever growing number of agricultural
banks  losing money.  At the end of 1985, about  23 percent of the
agricultural banks  in the Midwest lost money, compared with less  than one
percent  in 1980.  The number of non-agricultural banks  losing money
increased from about  6 percent to  13  percent over the  same period.
3.  Much of the decrease  in earning capacity in agricultural banks
can be traced to deteriorating loan quality in  agriculture.  Since 1980
net revenues  of agricultural banks has declined slightly and overhead has
increased slightly, but provisions  for bad and doubtful debt have48
increased dramatically, from  .2 percent of assets  in 1980  to  1.6  at  the
end of 1985.  Non-agricultural bank provisions  also were about  .2 percent
in 1980  and have not risen as  much.  Average provisions  for non-
agricultural banks were  .7 percent of  assets  at the  end of 1985.
Loan losses and nonperforming assets at  agricultural banks continued
to  climb in  1985, but year-end 1986 data will showed that the  rate of
increase in  losses has moderated.  Loan losses  for non-agricultural banks
have been about half the  level  of losses  for  agricultural banks.
However, it  should be noted that loan losses in small non-agricultural
banks, with assets of less  than $25 million, have been rising more
rapidly than for other non-agricultural banks.
4.  Agricultural banks  are generally better capitalized than
nonagricultural banks.  However the  capital base may not be sufficient to
save  a few of the banks.  At the end of 1985 there were 108  agricultural
banks  in  the Midwest with nonperforming assets greater than primary
capital.  By the middle of 1986 the number had risen to 137,  so  6 percent
of the  agricultural banks  in the Midwest were technically insolvent.
Year-end 1986  is  expected to  show a slight improvement in  the loan
quality and position of agricultural banks and fewer banks with
nonperforming assets  greater than capital.